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Our current methods of imposing criminal convictions on defen-
dants for copyright and trademark infringement are constitutionally
defective. Previous works have argued that due process under the
Sixth Amendment requires prosecutors to prove every element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including the jurisdictional ele-
ment. Applying this theory to criminal trademark counterfeiting
results in the conclusion that prosecutors should have to demon-
strate that an infringing mark needs to have traveled in or affected
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interstate commerce, which currently is not mandated. Parallel to
this construction of the Commerce Clause, criminal prosecutors
would also have to prove that Congress has the power to reach indi-
vidual copyright infringers under the Intellectual Property Clause.
This presents little difficulty under the traditional understanding of
the clause as prosecutors would need to show only that convicting a
defendant serves to secure the rights of authors. Some contemporary
scholars have argued, however, that the text of the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause must be understood to mean that Congress can only enact
copyright legislation if it serves to promote progress. If this notion is
correct and is combined with this Article’s theory of the Sixth
Amendment’s requirements, prosecutors would have to prove that
individual convictions will serve to promote progress before courts
can impose sentences in given cases. Although this requirement could
raise costs and potentially reduce the number of cases brought,
prosecutors may have little choice but to introduce expert testimony
to demonstrate an effect on progress, similar to the use of expert
evidence in antitrust litigation and related contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a world of difference between committing a murder and
manufacturing knockoff handbags. One would therefore not expect
that the case of Montana woman Jordan Linn Graham—who alleg-
edly intentionally pushed her husband off a cliff during an argu-
ment just days after their wedding—bears much relation to that of
a counterfeiter of materials protected by intellectual property (IP)
laws.1 In spite of the moral and social differences between the two
crimes, they are united by common features of constitutional crimi-
nal procedure. The ability of prosecutors to have either Graham or
a counterfeiter convicted in federal court depends on the existence
of a nexus to the constitutional text that establishes Congress’s
power to legislate. Even though manslaughter is usually a creature
of state rather than federal law, prosecutors had no trouble with
this aspect of the Graham case because the incident occurred in a
national park.2 Meanwhile, although copyright law and most of
current trademark law are properly governed by federal statutes in
the civil context, this Article shows that federal criminal prosecu-
tions for IP offenses today are potentially more questionable from
a constitutional perspective than the prosecution of Graham’s lethal
marital dispute.
Thus far, most of the debate surrounding the use of criminal
sanctions to combat intellectual property infringement has focused
on the wisdom of introducing or strengthening them.3 This Article
1. See Amanda Watts, Newlywed Wife Accused of Pushing Husband off Montana Cliff,
CNN (Sept. 11, 2013, 6:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/10/us/montana-husband-death/
index.html [http://perma.cc/B3T6-WFT9]. Graham later pleaded guilty to second-degree
murder. See Michael Martinez & Kyung Lah, Montana Newlywed Jordan Linn Graham
Pleads Guilty in Husband’s Murder, CNN (Dec. 12, 2013, 10:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/12/12/justice/montana-newlywed-death-trial [http://perma.cc/F9A2-VEKE].
2. See Graham Winch, Attorney: Newlywed’s Fall Was “Accident,” HLN (Sept. 13,
2013, 3:51 PM), http://www.hlntv.com/article/2013/09/13/montana-bride-jordan-graham-cody-
johnson-newlywed-death?hpt=hp_t2 [http://perma.cc/U7TJ-DEGY]; see also Brian C. Kalt, The
Perfect Crime, 93 GEO. L.J. 675, 678 (2005) (showing how criminal law may prove to be unable
to govern a strip of land near Yellowstone National Park because the defendant’s
constitutional right “to a jury trial and an impartial jury of inhabitants of the state and
district where the crime was committed” cannot be satisfied in that area).
3. See, e.g., Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 157, 160
(2014) [hereinafter Manta, High Cost]; Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for
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asks a more foundational question: Are federal criminal sanctions
for IP offenses constitutional on their face and as applied? As a re-
lated matter, does the answer to that question differ in the case of
criminal sanctions for copyright infringement, for which Congress
draws its authority from the IP Clause of the Constitution,4 as op-
posed to those for trademark infringement, which Congress reg-
ulates under the auspices of the Commerce Clause? The analysis of
these questions demonstrates that criminal prosecutions for intel-
lectual property violations do not honor the constitutional obligation
to maintain the presumption of innocence for defendants, and shows
what courts need to do to fix this error.5
The Constitution explicitly discusses the authority of Congress to
use criminal punishments in only four places. First, it empowers
Congress “[t]o provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the
Securities and current Coin of the United States.”6 Second, Congress
shall be able “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies commit-
ted on the high Seas, and Offences against the law of nations.”7
Third, Congress may “exercise exclusive legislation” over federal
property, which arguably includes the area of criminal law.8 Fourth,
the Constitution specifies that “Congress shall have Power to de-
clare the Punishment of Treason.”9 Federal criminal law, however,
covers a multitude of offenses not even remotely connected to these
Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 473 (2011) [hereinafter Manta,
Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions].
4. The IP Clause, also known as the Copyright Clause, exists “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. See infra Part II.B-D.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
7. Id. cl. 10. During the debates at the North Carolina constitutional ratifying conven-
tion, the future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell stated: “They have power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of
nations. They have no power to define any other crime whatever.” Statement of James Iredell
(July 29, 1788), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADEL-
PHIA, IN 1787, at 219 (photo. reprint 1941) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter
ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; see also Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and Defining in the
Constitution’s Law of Nations Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1675, 1702 n.131 (2012) (providing
sources that echo or discuss this sentiment).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
9. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 3.
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four areas.10 Similarly, the criminal punishment of intellectual prop-
erty infringement has not been and cannot be justified as part of
these four delegations of power.
Rather, the many criminal laws enacted despite their lack of a re-
lationship to these four areas have generally been justified as con-
stitutional due to their role in enforcing other enumerated powers,
or as necessary and proper in the pursuit of congressional regula-
tion under the Commerce Clause.11 The traditional story would place
copyright-related criminal sanctions into the former category and
trademark-related criminal sanctions into the latter and would jus-
tify their existence accordingly. This Article argues, however, that
matters are not so simple and that several uncomfortable questions
arise as one digs more deeply into the constitutionality of these
sanctions.
Complications stem mainly from the prosecutor’s burden to prove
the facts of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The case of
Jordan Linn Graham illustrates that one such set of facts is the re-
lationship between each particular defendant and the constitutional
mandate that allows federal courts to punish that defendant. In the
Graham case, a federal prosecutor not only had to show that the
defendant killed her husband, but also that she did so in a national
park. The federal power to prosecute her hinged on that fact—if she
killed him elsewhere, no federal court could convict her. Criminal
prosecutions for trademark and copyright offenses are no different:
there needs to be a “jurisdictional hook” for a federal court to convict
each defendant.12 This Article shows that for trademark counterfeit-
ing, prosecutors should have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
10. The current estimate is that there are between 4000 and 5000 federal criminal
statutes, but nobody knows the exact number because no comprehensive list exists. There
may also be over 300,000 different statutory or regulatory offenses that contain the possibility
of criminal penalties. See Edwin Meese, III, Overcriminalization in Practice: Trends and
Recent Controversies, 8 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 505, 509-10 (2012). When recently asked
to provide a list of the approximately 4500 criminal provisions in effect, the Congressional
Research Service refused to do so, citing lack of manpower and resources to complete the task.
See Todd Ruger, Way Too Many Criminal Laws, Lawyers Tell Congress, BLOG LEGALTIMES
(June 14, 2013, 1:18 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/06/way-too-many-criminal-
laws-lawyers-tell-congress.html [http://perma.cc/U8K8-7FZX].
11. For a discussion of Congress’s power in this area as related to the concerns of the Anti-
Federalists, see, for example, Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal
Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69, 101-02 (2012).
12. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.2(c), at 34-35 (3d ed. 2007).
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that a defendant sold or transported a counterfeit good in interstate
commerce or that the good affected interstate commerce. This Ar-
ticle also demonstrates that in the context of criminal copyright
infringement cases, prosecutors should have to show that convicting
a defendant will serve to secure the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner. Doing so is straightforward under the traditional view of the
IP Clause. Yet, this is not necessarily the case if one accepts a more
limiting reading, which would only allow Congress to enact IP laws
that promote progress, as a number of scholars have advocated in
recent years. If one adopts the narrower view, then under my theory
of criminal due process, prosecutors would also have to demonstrate
that the securing of rights is taking place in each case in a way that
advances the progress of science and the useful arts beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. These changes would reshape the landscape of crim-
inal trademark and copyright prosecutions to varying degrees if
courts adopted them.
In Part I, the Article examines how the Framers viewed the Con-
stitution’s relationship to criminal sanctions and how early court
cases decided those issues. The Article then discusses the history of
federal criminal sanctions since the Founding and how the Supreme
Court has handled some key constitutional challenges to such
sanctions. Part II evaluates the merits of possible constitutional
challenges to federal criminal sanctions for intellectual property
violations.
I. FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE 
MODERN ERA
This Part shows the Framers’ views of criminal law and high-
lights some key congressional and judicial developments regarding
federal criminal law between the Founding and today. Rather than
trying to cover all the related statutes and cases in that period, this
Part focuses on those events and arguments that provide the most
important pieces of information necessary to evaluate the constitu-
tionality of federal criminal sanctions for intellectual property.13
13. For this analysis, see supra Part II.
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A. The Framers’ Views of Federal Criminal Law
Although punishing crimes is an important function of govern-
ment, and thirty-four of the fifty-five delegates at the Constitutional
Convention were either lawyers or had studied law, criminal law
was not a major topic of discussion.14 When the Constitution was
enacted, it was understood that the federal government was not to
have a general police power like that of the state governments.15 We
have some information about the Framers’ general views on approp-
riate levels of punishment, but we know much less about their opin-
ions on the proper division between federal and state authority over
crimes.16 The Federalist Papers reveal only scant consideration of
issues involving federal criminal law on the part of the Framers.17
A search of the Federalist Papers reveals just seven instances in
which the word “crime” or “crimes” appears and sixteen instances in
which the word “criminal” is used.18 Most of these appearances occur
in Federalist No. 83, written in part to respond to states’ concerns
that the Constitution would not explicitly provide for a trial by jury
in civil cases.19 In Federalist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton argued
against the theory that just because the Constitution would explicit-
ly provide for trial by jury only in criminal cases, the silence on this
matter for civil cases “is an implied prohibition of trial by jury in
regard to the latter. The rules of legal interpretation are rules of
commonsense.”20 Hamilton basically argued against an overly
14. JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE
FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 115 (2012).
15. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.2(c); see ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 7.
16. RONALD J. PESTRITTO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAW: PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 119-38 (2000).
17. The Federalist Papers consist of the eighty-five essays that Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and John Jay wrote in 1787 and 1788 to elaborate on the Constitution and
encourage its ratification in the state of New York. Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the
Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87
B.U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2007).
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ.
Press 2009).
19. Id.
20. Id. Of course, the Bill of Rights did ultimately provide a right to jury trial in both civil
and criminal cases. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII; see also Cassandra Burke Robertson, Jud-
ging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157, 190 (2008) (discussing judges’ discretion to reexamine
factual findings in the criminal and civil contexts based on the history and text of the Seventh
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expansive understanding of the principle of statutory interpretation
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.21 At the same time, although
he stated that juries would not be prohibited in civil cases, one can-
not conclusively ascertain from his statement that they should be
mandated like in criminal cases either. Hamilton may have thought
that the enumeration of four areas of congressional authority over
criminal legislation need not mean that such legislation outside
these areas would be out of the question if it was necessary and
proper.22 Hamilton concluded Federalist No. 83 by dismissing the
idea “that there is no security for liberty in a Constitution which
expressly establishes the trial by jury in criminal cases, because it
does not do it in civil also.”23
The other Federalist Papers provide few clues about the Framers’
thoughts on the subject of criminal punishment. At one point, James
Madison emphasized in a more general context that the powers of
the federal government were limited to a few defined ones that
would mainly focus on war, peace, negotiation, foreign commerce,
and taxation.24 The state governments would deal with the vast
remainder of subjects “which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”25 In a
separate essay, Madison also explained the necessity of having the
federal government punish monetary counterfeiting: “The punish-
ment of counterfeiting the public securities, as well as the current
coin, is submitted of course to that authority which is to secure the
value of both.”26 The text lists counterfeiting as a separate offense
because the Constitution adopted a more limited definition of
treason rather than the common law understanding, which had
included counterfeiting.27 Monetary counterfeiting had to be listed
Amendment). 
21. “[T]he mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other.” Hardy v. N.Y.C. Health
& Hosps. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 794 (2d Cir. 1999). 
22. Some of the Framers feared the potential of the Necessary and Proper Clause to
override states’ rights. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455-56 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)
(discussing that concern during the proceedings of June 8, 1789).
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 18, at 429. 
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 18, at 237 (James Madison). 
25. Id.
26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 18, at 217 (James Madison). 
27. BESSLER, supra note 14, at 115.
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on its own in the Constitution if the federal government was to have
the power to punish it.
B. Federal Criminal Law Between the Founding and the New Deal
Shortly after the Constitution was ratified, Congress passed what
came to be called the Crime Act of 1790.28 The law sought to punish
a number of different offenses. The first set consisted of the types of
crimes specifically enumerated in the Constitution: treason, piracy
and other crimes on the high seas or that violated the law of na-
tions, and crimes taking place in areas of sole federal jurisdiction.29
The law also addressed many other offenses, however, such as
bribery of federal judges, interference with the judicial process,
freeing federal prisoners, and theft or falsification of court records.30
Even before the Crime Act of 1790, Congress had enacted criminal
penalties for actions such as unloading ships in the dark or without
a license, or being a census taker who fails to report his findings;
hence, several scholars have argued that “the First Congress did not
view the list of topics of federal criminal law as implicitly negating
authority to create other offenses when that was necessary and
proper to the exercise of some other explicit federal power.”31
An important moment in this context occurred when the Supreme
Court decided the seminal case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which
dealt with the question of whether the federal government could
charter a bank.32 The case established that Congress has not only
express but also implied powers, and that it may—via the Necessary
and Proper Clause—pursue objectives that are rationally related to
enumerated powers and not prohibited by the Constitution.33 These
powers include the ability to punish crimes.34
Most federal criminal sanctions created before the Civil War
were “self-defensive criminal jurisdiction,” criminal prohibitions
28. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
29. Id. §§ 1, 3, 8, 1 Stat. at 112-13.
30. Id. §§ 15, 21-23, 1 Stat. at 116-17.
31. E.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First
Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 833 (1994).
32. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 322 (1819). 
33. See id. at 316.
34. See id. at 417.
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protecting the operation of the federal government.35 The main
exception to this trend was criminal sanctions related to commercial
interstate carriers.36 After the Civil War, Congress began interpret-
ing its authority over criminal law more expansively and passing
laws that often punished behaviors already criminalized under state
law.37 In an important signal to Congress about the limits of its
power, the Supreme Court struck down Congress’s attempt to
criminalize discrimination by individuals, reasoning that the 1875
Civil Rights Act did not extend to the regulation of private citizens.38
Around the same period, the Supreme Court evaluated a criminal
sanction related to intellectual property for the first time. In the
Trade-Mark Cases, the Court decided whether criminal sanctions for
trademark counterfeiting passed constitutional muster.39 First, the
Court ruled that Congress could not legislate trademarks via the IP
Clause because trademarks qualified neither as writings nor discov-
eries, demanding in their creation “no fancy or imagination, no
genius, no laborious thought.”40 Next, the Supreme Court turned its
attention to whether Congress could regulate trademarks as part of
its power over interstate commerce. The Court concluded that al-
though Congress clearly had the authority to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, between citizens of different states, and be-
tween U.S. citizens and foreign ones, “there still remains a very
large amount of commerce, perhaps the largest, which, being trade
or traffic between citizens of the same State, is beyond the control
of Congress.”41 The Court explained that when Congress passed its
original trademark legislation on registration and civil remedies in
1870, it failed to require that the commerce regulated fall into one
of the above-mentioned permissible categories.42 Thus, the criminal
offenses passed in 1876, and predicated on the 1870 law, were
unconstitutional just like the initial legislation.43
35. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12.
36. Id. 
37. See id.
38. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 25 (1883).
39. 100 U.S. 82, 82 (1879).
40. Id. at 94.
41. Id. at 96.
42. Id. at 99.
43. Id. Congress later passed trademark legislation that was based on and conformed to
the Commerce Clause requirements. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, The
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The Supreme Court was more generous toward congressional
authority in upholding provisions that criminalized the use of postal
channels in the service of fraud, lotteries, or obscenity,44 the trans-
portation of lottery tickets across state lines,45 or the transportation
in interstate commerce of women engaged in prostitution or related
illicit activities.46 The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
saw an expansion in a variety of federal regulatory crimes as citi-
zens’ mobility increased, and it became more difficult for individual
states to contain criminals on their own.47 An example of this de-
velopment was the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold criminal
sanctions against auto theft conspiracies that operated across state
lines, preventing thieves from stealing cars in one place and driving
them to other states where they could no longer be apprehended.48
By the 1930s, Congress confidently criminalized a wide variety of
activities, including the transportation of a kidnapping victim across
state lines, interstate flight to avoid being prosecuted for specific
violent felonies, certain firearm-related offenses, interstate trans-
portation of stolen property, robbery of a national bank, and extor-
tion via the use of the phone, telegraph, or radio.49 Expansion of the
federal criminal law was thus well on its way before the beginning
of the New Deal.
C. Federal Criminal Law After the New Deal
The Supreme Court began taking a more lenient approach toward
federal economic regulation in the 1930s. In Wickard v. Filburn, the
Court famously upheld under the Commerce Clause a regulation
that limited a farmer’s ability to grow wheat for his own consump-
tion because the aggregate impact of farmers doing so would have
a sufficient effect on the interstate market (by reducing the overall
History of Intellectual Property Taxation: Promoting Innovation and Other Intellectual
Property Goals?, 64 SMU L. REV. 795, 821 n.133 (2011).
44. In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134-35 (1892).
45. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 354 (1903). 
46. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913).
47. Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1141-44 (1995). 
48. See Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 438-39 (1925).
49. See Brickey, supra note 47, at 1143-44. 
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demand for wheat).50 At that time, however, Congress preferred to
enact federal criminal legislation that required proof in every
prosecution of a “nexus” between the criminal act and interstate
commerce (a nexus also known as a jurisdictional hook) rather than
legislation justified by the aggregate impact of local crime on
interstate commerce.51 The Supreme Court later emphasized the
importance of this hook in United States v. Bass by requiring it in
the case of statutory ambiguity as a protection of federalism
principles and a limit on Congress’s ability to improperly expand
into the states’ province of law making.52
The Court, however, gave a fairly high degree of latitude to Con-
gress when interpreting the connection to commerce, ruling in Perez
v. United States that Congress could criminalize improper intrastate
credit transactions without showing an effect on interstate com-
merce in every case.53 Rather, looking to previous civil cases invol-
ving racial discrimination by hotels and restaurants, the Court held
that Congress can legislate based on class activities and “[w]here
the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach
of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial,
individual instances’ of the class.”54 This holding turned out to be
incredibly important to later Supreme Court doctrine and opened
the door to a wide variety of criminal laws against classes that alleg-
edly had an impact on commerce, rather than individuals who had
an impact.55 As far as can be ascertained, however, nobody tried to
mount a due process challenge based on the Sixth Amendment
against this idea in Perez or its progeny.
Overall, the Supreme Court did not put up too many obstacles
in the area of criminal legislation until United States v. Lopez, in
which it held that an individual’s possession of a firearm near a
school did not substantially affect commerce and therefore could not
be criminalized under the Commerce Clause.56 The government
50. 317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942).
51. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12.
52. 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971).
53. 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971).
54. Id. at 154 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968)).
55. See, e.g., Thane Rehn, Note, RICO and the Commerce Clause: A Reconsideration of the
Scope of Federal Criminal Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1991, 1996, 2020-35 (2008).
56. 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02
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tried to show a relationship between violent crime and interstate
commerce, but the Court remained unconvinced, noting in part the
lack of congressional findings on the matter.57 In some ways it ap-
peared that Lopez represented a break with the Court’s reluctance
to interfere with congressional decisions in the area of criminal law.
But as discussed in the next Section, three recent cases show that
the Court continues to grant a high degree of latitude in this area.
D. The Most Recent Pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the
Constitutionality of Federal Criminal Sanctions
One of the most important recent tests of Congress’s power ap-
peared in Gonzales v. Raich, which considered whether individuals
(or caregivers) who were growing medical marijuana in a manner
permitted by the California Compassionate Care Act could be con-
victed under the Federal Controlled Substances Act for the posses-
sion and growth of this marijuana.58 The Supreme Court, aligning
the case with Wickard rather than with Lopez or United States v.
Morrison, ruled that this criminalization was constitutional.59 The
majority concluded that the growth of marijuana involved economic
activity like that in Wickard rather than non-economic activities
like those in Lopez.60 Looking to the reasoning in Perez, the Court
held that “[w]hen Congress decides that the total incidence of a
practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the
entire class.”61 The Court explained that it need not decide whether
the aggregate of all medical marijuana users affect interstate com-
merce but only whether there is a rational basis to conclude that
(2000) (holding that civil damages for gender-based violence was unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause, expressly endorsing the reasoning in Lopez).
57. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64. For a discussion of the effect of Lopez on jurisdictional
hooks in other types of statutes, see Christopher DiPompeo, Comment, Federal Hate Crime
Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element
Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617 (2008).
58. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
59. Id. at 9.
60. Id. at 18 (“The similarities between this case and Wickard are striking.”). Justice
O’Connor wrote in a dissent joined in part by two other Justices, however, that the case at bar
was “materially indistinguishable from Lopez and Morrison when the same considerations are
taken into account.” Id. at 45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 17 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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they do.62 The Court reasoned that because Congress was legislating
as part of a permissible comprehensive regulatory scheme, individ-
ual components should not be excised from that scheme.63 Of
particular interest to this Article, the statute under examination in
Raich seemed to implicitly embody the view that the conduct it
criminalized affected interstate commerce and never required
prosecutors to show that the activity actually did.
Both Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas filed vehement dis-
sents in the case.64 Justice O’Connor deplored the removal of any
real limits on congressional power under the Commerce Clause and
criticized Congress’s failure to show that the intrastate cultivation
and possession of marijuana for medical use actually had a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.65 She also stated:
If the Court is right, then Lopez stands for nothing more than a
drafting guide: Congress should have described the relevant
crime as “transfer or possession of a firearm anywhere in the
nation”—thus including commercial and noncommercial activity,
and clearly encompassing some activity with assuredly substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.”66
Justice Thomas wrote that Congress does not have the power to
criminalize local growth and possession of marijuana under either
the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, and that
this regulation would have been unimaginable in the early days of
the Republic.67 Justice Thomas charged: “The majority’s rewriting
of the Commerce Clause seems to be rooted in the belief that, unless
the Commerce Clause covers the entire web of human activity,
Congress will be left powerless to regulate the national economy
effectively.”68 He did not believe that medical marijuana users in
62. Id. at 22.
63. Id. 
64. Raich, 545 U.S. at 42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 57 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 46-49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 46. As a historical matter, that is ultimately what took place. Congress redrafted
the Gun Free School Zones Act to include such a hook and several United States Courts of
Appeals upheld the revised statute. See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1045-46
(9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999).
67. Raich, 545 U.S. at 58-59 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 70.
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California and other states were placing substantial amounts of the
drug into interstate commerce; thus, Congress should not be able to
regulate their activities under the substantial effects test.69 It is
important to emphasize here that one’s views of whether the
decision in Wickard was correct need not determine one’s opinion of
the Raich outcome. The Wickard case concerned purely civil issues
that do not involve the kinds of due process protections that the
Constitution promises to criminal defendants.70
Another important case that raised similar issues as Raich
followed in 2010. United States v. Comstock sought to resolve
whether a federal statute permitting a district court to civilly
commit a sexually dangerous prisoner beyond the end of his prison
term was constitutional.71 The Court found the practice constitu-
tional for five reasons: (1) Congress has broad powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause;72 (2) Congress has a long involvement
in providing mental health care for federal prisoners;73 (3) Congress
acted reasonably in extending its ability to use civil commitment
over individuals in federal custody even if the commitment detained
them past their prison terms;74 (4) the relevant statute properly took
account of state interests;75 and (5) the links between the statute
and Congress’s enumerated Article I powers were not too attenu-
ated.76
Justice Thomas, dissenting, argued that no enumerated power
gave Congress the authority to enact this type of civil-commitment
regime.77 He specifically faulted the majority for finding constitu-
tionality on the basis that the statute is tied to existing laws that
Congress had enacted rather than being tied to those powers actu-
ally listed in the Constitution.78 Justice Thomas explained that the
statute “requires no evidence that [a] sexually dangerous condition
69. Id. at 73-74.
70. For a more extended discussion of the important differences between civil and criminal
cases in this respect, see text accompanying infra Part II.E.
71. 560 U.S. 126, 129 (2010); see H. Jefferson Powell, The Regrettable Clause: United
States v. Comstock and the Powers of Congress, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 713, 714 (2011).
72. Comstock, 560 U.S. at 133.
73. Id. at 137.
74. Id. at 142.
75. Id. at 143.
76. Id. at 146.
77. Id. at 163 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 167-68.
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will manifest itself in a way that interferes with a federal law that
executes an enumerated power or in a geographic location over
which Congress has plenary authority.”79 He did not believe that the
enumerated powers that enable Congress to arrest or convict a de-
fendant justify subsequent civil detention.80 Rather, Justice Thomas
thought that the federal government could only civilly detain a
mentally ill person over whom it had federal criminal jurisdiction.81
And as far as federalism issues are concerned, according to Justice
Thomas, a law that falls outside the enumerated powers by defini-
tion intrudes on states’ rights.82
The third recent case that tested congressional power over crim-
inal law is United States v. Kebodeaux, which addressed whether a
registration requirement under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) was constitutional.83 The Court upheld
Congress’s decision to subject to SORNA’s requirements an individ-
ual already required to register under the Wetterling Act, a statute
considered valid under the Military Regulation and Necessary and
Proper Clauses.84 In the Court’s view, Congress gathered enough
evidence on the special recidivism issues concerning sex offenders
to conclude that the statute had a reasonable basis, which was suf-
ficient to pass constitutional muster.85 Thus, SORNA’s changes were
constitutionally appropriate as applied to the defendant.86 Interest-
ingly, although Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment, he
warned against the risk that the majority opinion would be inter-
preted as granting a federal police power.87 Despite having joined
the majority opinion in Comstock, he stated that “[t]he fact of a prior
federal conviction, by itself, does not give Congress a freestanding,
independent, and perpetual interest in protecting the public from
79. Id. at 171-72.
80. Id. at 171.
81. Id. at 176. 
82. Id. at 179 n.16.
83. 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2500 (2013). For an examination of the relationship between the case
and the issue of jurisdictional hooks, see Casey B. Nathan, Searching for “Jurisdictional
Hook”: United States v. Kebodeaux and the Constitutional Limits of the Sex Offender Registra-
tion and Notification Act, 33 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 53 (2013).
84. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2504.
85. Id. at 2503.
86. Id. at 2505.
87. Id. at 2507 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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the convict’s purely intrastate conduct.”88 Meanwhile, Justice Alito
concurred in the judgment because he viewed the decision as a
proper extension of military jurisdiction given that the defendant
had been convicted in a military court.89
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. In addition to joining most
of Justice Thomas’s dissent, Justice Scalia explained that he was
not convinced “that the Wetterling Act’s registration requirement
was itself a valid exercise of any federal power, or that SORNA is
designed to carry the Wetterling Act into execution. The former
proposition is dubious, the latter obviously untrue.”90 Justice
Thomas would have held SORNA unconstitutional as applied to the
defendant because the law related neither to an enumerated power
under Article 1, Section 8, nor to the Commerce Clause.91 He wrote
that “Congress does not retain a general police power over every
person who has ever served in the military.”92 He disagreed with the
majority that SORNA was quite similar to the existing Wetterling
Act,93 and questioned what a measure generally meant to protect
the public has to do with regulating the armed forces.94 Justice
Thomas deplored that the Court had gone a step further than it had
in Comstock given that the defendant in Kebodeaux was not even in
federal custody when Congress enacted SORNA, and yet he became
subject to the law’s requirements.95
These recent cases exemplify the Supreme Court’s unwillingness
to rein in the holding from Perez or to limit Wickard to civil cases,
contrary to what this Article argues it should be doing. The refusal
to constrict federal power over criminal law largely crosses ideologi-
cal lines, affecting the decisions of both Republican and Democratic
appointees to the Supreme Court.96 The Court’s refusal has also
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 2509 (Alito, J., concurring). 
90. Id. at 2509-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
91. Id. at 2512-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2514 n.3.
94. Id. at 2516. 
95. Id. at 2517.
96. Justice Scalia joined Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in upholding the
Controlled Substances Act in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan in
upholding the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act in Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at
2499.
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extended to the fates of individuals who were most likely engaged
in victimless behavior, such as in Raich,97 and those who suffered
repercussions for their potential as future dangers to others, such
as in Comstock98 and Kebodeaux.99 Viewing the defendants from
these cases in the aggregate should give us particular pause, as all
the cases involved defendants who were punished or seriously en-
cumbered by the federal government, even though the likelihood
that they would inflict harm on society was based on a heavy dose
of conjecture. This is not to say that none of them could conceivably
pose a danger. Rather, the question is how much deference Congress
should receive in those areas as a constitutional matter.
II. THE CASE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS FOR IP INFRINGEMENT
Congress has shown little concern that any of the criminal stat-
utes it has enacted related to copyright or trademark infringement
might be unconstitutional. The legislative history of the first federal
statute criminalizing copyright infringement in 1897, which was
limited to only public performance of a dramatic or musical work,
gave no indication that enacting criminal copyright laws was in any
way considered to exceed Congress’s authority.100 Although mem-
bers of Congress objected to the criminalization of public perfor-
mances of copyrighted works for being either too severe or an
unnecessary measure to protect copyright owners, they did not
discuss the constitutional source of congressional power to make
copyright infringement a misdemeanor.101 Similarly, in the legisla-
tive history leading up to the Copyright Act of 1909, which expanded
criminal liability for copyright infringement to all works except for
sound recordings, the discussion did not indicate that such laws
could be beyond Congress’s power to enact. At the proceedings of the
Conference on Copyright—the body that discussed and drafted the
97. Raich, 545 U.S. at 6-7 (majority opinion).
98. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129 (2010).
99. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2503.
100. See Zvi S. Rosen, The Twilight of the Opera Pirates: A Prehistory of the Exclusive Right
of Public Performance for Musical Compositions, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1157, 1203-07
(2007) (discussing the dynamics surrounding inclusion of criminal sanctions for copyright
infringement at that time).
101. See 29 CONG. REC. 85-91 (1896). 
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1909 Act—some attendees debated whether the “penalty clause,”
which would now be understood as a statutory or liquidated dama-
ges provision, should be framed in a moderate manner so as to
convince Congress to adopt both the “penalty clause” provision and
the criminal provision.102 There may have been some sentiment that
the combination of deterrent measures in the new law could amount
to unnecessarily broad protection that Congress would be unwilling
to adopt. There was no express indication, however, that greater
protection would run afoul of the Constitution. Speakers during the
hearings before the Committee on Patents directed any objections
to the criminal provisions of the Act to the injustice of criminalizing
infringement, but no one levied constitutional arguments against
the law.103
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 was the first federal
law to criminalize trademark infringement following the Supreme
Court’s invalidation of the early trademark statutes in the Trade-
Mark Cases.104 Again, like in the case of criminal copyright legisla-
tion, the legislative history contains no suggestion that Congress
ever viewed criminal trademark infringement laws as unconstitu-
tional.105 And like in the criminal copyright context, objections to
criminal trademark laws rested on the grounds that the imposition
of criminal penalties for infringement represented too harsh a solu-
tion for the problems that counterfeiting posed, but opponents never
stated that enacting criminal laws in this context exceeded Con-
gress’s power if Congress deemed them necessary.106 The proponents
of the bill did, however, indicate that they wished to limit the
criminal provisions to uses of trademarks in a commercial context,
102. See 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 227, 229, 230 (E. Fulton
Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976).
103. See Pending Bills to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings
Before the H. & S. Comms. on Patents, 60 Cong. (1908), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, supra note 102, at 155.
104. For a discussion of the debates about the introduction of a criminal provision for
trademark counterfeiting, see generally Zvi S. Rosen, In Search of the Trade-Mark Cases:
The Nascent Treaty Power and the Turbulent Origins of Federal Trademark Law, 83 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 827, 842-46 (2009).
105. See Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984: Hearings on H.R. 2447 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-
997 (1984); S. REP. NO. 98-526 (1984); 130 CONG. REC. 24,658-61 (1984).
106. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-997, at 35-36 (providing additional views of Robert W.
Kastenmeier).
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rather than simply possession of counterfeit goods or advertising, so
as to avoid constitutional concerns.107
This Part argues that despite Congress’s apparent lack of mis-
givings on the subject, constitutional concerns may exist about the
current enforcement of criminal sanctions against copyright infrin-
gers and trademark counterfeiters.
A. A Due Process Critique of Federal Criminal Law
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued the Raich decision,
Margaret Lemos criticized the Court’s federal criminal law juris-
prudence on the basis that some of it violated the constitutional
requirement that all “the facts that expose an individual to criminal
punishment be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”108 She
argued that Congress, with the blessing of the Court, has been using
the Commerce Clause as a shield against meeting this requirement
by tying the prohibited conduct to interstate commerce, the Court
preferring to find those facts itself instead of submitting them to a
jury in every case.109 Some acts Congress has passed contain a so-
called “jurisdictional element,” which establishes the basis for fed-
eral power for every offense by showing a connection between a
defendant’s actions and interstate commerce and requiring prosecu-
tors to show that this connection exists in any given case beyond a
reasonable doubt.110 But other statutes, like the one discussed in
Raich, just involve the implicit conclusion that the type of conduct
at bar affects interstate commerce.111 Lemos believes that part of the
problem is that the Supreme Court has simply imported its jurispru-
dence from civil Commerce Clause cases into the criminal arena and
107. See id. at 10.
108. Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption
of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2006); see In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). For a discussion of due process issues arising under the
Fifth Amendment as they relate to intellectual property in the form of gene patents, see
generally Sapna Kumar, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Genetic Information, 65 ALA. L. REV.
625 (2014).
109. Lemos, supra note 108.
110. Id. at 1205-06.
111. Id. See generally Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich:
On Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2101 (2006) (questioning the effect of jurisdictional elements post-Raich).
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incidentally eliminated constitutionally mandated protections.112
The Supreme Court itself in United States v. Lopez raised the
problem of the lack of a jurisdictional element in the federal
firearms possession statute as an argument against a finding of
constitutionality. It criticized the statute for having “no express
jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set
of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection
with or effect on interstate commerce.”113 Such an “element ... would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
question affects interstate commerce.”114 One could thus argue that
a consistent application of Lopez actually prevents Congress from
leaving jurisdictional elements out of statutes in an attempt to
evade constitutional requirements.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, judges can decide facts for
themselves even in criminal cases, but the Rules limit this ability
to facts generally known or easily ascertainable; juries receive expli-
cit instruction that they are not required to accept such judicial
notice as conclusive.115 Scholars, such as Chip Carter, have warned
that even if the Sixth Amendment and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence appear inefficient with respect to the jurisdictional elements
of crimes, “the desire for efficiency should not trump the defendant’s
right to jury trial.”116 In other words, not all shortcuts are constitu-
tional.
For federal criminal sanctions, cases like Perez v. United States
introduced a dangerous heuristic by stating that Congress may
regulate certain groups due to their effects on interstate commerce
as a class even when the government demonstrated no effect in an
individual case.117 The decision in Perez has the constitutional anal-
ysis backwards when it states that courts do not have the power to
excise individuals when Congress may otherwise regulate a class.118
The default is supposed to be that the federal government can only
regulate areas in which the Constitution allows it to do so. To say,
112. Lemos, supra note 108, at 1205-07.
113. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
114. Id. at 561.
115. See William M. Carter, Jr., “Trust Me, I’m a Judge”: Why Binding Judicial Notice of
Jurisdictional Facts Violates the Right to Jury Trial, 68 MO. L. REV. 649, 650 (2003).
116. Id. at 690.
117. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
118. Id.
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like the Perez Court did, that courts cannot excise individuals from
a class that Congress can regulate presupposes that Congress can
regulate individuals even if their personal actions bear no relation
to interstate commerce. If a class that Congress can regulate is al-
ways drawn up of only individuals whose actions do affect interstate
commerce, then the courts would not need to excise anyone from the
class.
The Supreme Court has effectively allowed Congress to impose
regimes of collective guilt. In the case of Raich, Congress made a
probabilistic evaluation that the average marijuana user affects
interstate commerce.119 The requirement that all elements of an
offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, however, pre-
cisely opposes the idea of allowing probabilistic judgments and
heuristics above an unavoidable minimum. If four brothers are
sitting in prison as convicted murderers and their fifth brother is
now suspected of murder, we do not allow prosecutors to tell a jury
that based on the behavior of his brothers, he is likely guilty as well.
This analogy can be critiqued from a number of angles, but the key
point remains: the law generally wants to know what a jury can say
with near certainty about a single individual. I am not aware of any
court decision that explains why jurisdictional facts should be treat-
ed differently from other facts under the Sixth Amendment, yet
judges seem to implicitly assume this to be the case. Lemos and
Carter have written about the constitutional issues that arise as a
result of courts’ choices to treat jurisdictional facts differently in the
context of the Commerce Clause120 and territorial jurisdiction.121 The
following Section shows how this creates problems in the context of
criminal sanctions for certain forms of trademark infringement.
Part II.C expands this discussion to possible constitutional implica-
tions for criminal enforcement of copyright within the context of the
IP Clause.
119. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
120. See generally Lemos, supra note 108.
121. See Carter, Jr., supra note 115, at 650.
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B. Due Process Implications for Criminal Enforcement Against
Trademark Counterfeiting
The Commerce Clause has traditionally been the constitutional
source of congressional power over trademark law, including over
the imposition of criminal sanctions for certain forms of infringe-
ment.122 Therefore, the requirement that every element in a crimi-
nal prosecution be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including the
nexus to interstate commerce discussed above, fully applies in the
context of criminal prosecutions for trademark offenses. The main
statute of interest in this area is 18 U.S.C. § 2320, which outlaws
trafficking in counterfeit goods or services.123 The language of the
law, including its definitional section, does not refer to interstate
commerce. The word “traffic” is defined as “to transport, transfer, or
otherwise dispose of, to another, for purposes of commercial advan-
tage or private financial gain, or to make, import, export, obtain
control of, or possess, with intent to so transport, transfer, or
otherwise dispose of.”124 The statute explains what types of goods
constitute counterfeits but never references interstate commerce.125
The closest that the statute comes to tying the offense to interstate
commerce is in its definition of “counterfeit mark.” A counterfeit
must be “identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a
mark registered on the principal register”126 and “applied to or used
in connection with the goods or services for which the mark is
registered.”127 One could argue that because only marks used in
interstate commerce can be registered,128 by definition, a counterfeit
can infringe on only a mark that has been used in interstate
commerce. This argument would raise the question of whether the
counterfeit mark is ontologically the “same” as the original mark
122. Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1488 (2004) (citing United
States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 1999)).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012).
124. Id. § 2320(f)(5).
125. Id. § 2320(a). But see id. § 2320(h)(2)(C)(ii) (prohibiting the “transshipment and expor-
tation” through or from the United States of any goods or services of which the statute
prevents trafficking).
126. Id. § 2320(f)(1)(A)(ii).
127. Id. § 2320(f)(1)(A)(iii).
128. “The word ‘commerce’ means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Con-
gress.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
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when it comes to use in commerce; thus, by definition, the link to
interstate commerce would be present for every counterfeit.129
More likely, however, to satisfy due process requirements, a pros-
ecutor would have to show that the counterfeit goods in a given case
either (1) made use of the channels or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or (2) affected interstate commerce. Just because the
original trademark was used in interstate commerce does not neces-
sarily mean that the counterfeit was as well. Hence, the government
would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the counterfeit
was actually used in interstate commerce, which is currently not a
requirement.130 In many cases, this would represent a minor hurdle
because, for example, goods sold over the Internet would likely
qualify as having made use of the channels or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce.131 If no channels or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce were used, prosecutors would have to work
harder to demonstrate that intrastate counterfeiting affected in-
terstate commerce. Increasing prosecutors’ burden as well as the
amount of resources needed for a given type of case could decrease
the already small number of cases brought every year.132 Or, the
currently small number could lead to a fairly modest absolute
increase in the government’s total burden, and although the costs
of individual prosecutions would rise, the number of cases could
remain steady.133
So far, the few constitutional challenges to § 2320 have generally
focused on the claim that the statute is unconstitutionally vague; all
have failed.134 To my knowledge, no case has entailed the type of due
129. See infra Part II.E.
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320; Lemos, supra note 108.
131. Christopher Lieb Nybo, Comment, Dialing M for Murder: Assessing the Interstate
Commerce Requirement for Federal Murder-for-Hire, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 579, 596 n.130
(2001) (summarizing cases in which courts held that the Internet is an instrumentality of
interstate commerce).
132. Miriam Bitton, Rethinking the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’s Criminal Copy-
right Enforcement Measures, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 67, 89-90 (2012) (discussing the
relationship between the high costs of intellectual property infringement prosecutions and the
low number brought every year).
133. I would like to thank Will Baude for our conversation on this point.
134. See, e.g., United States v. Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a
constitutional challenge that relied on a claim of vagueness); United States v. Bohai Trading
Co., 45 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170 (11th Cir.
1987) (same).
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process challenge to the trademark counterfeiting criminal statute
on the basis described in this Article.
C. Extending the Due Process Critique to Criminal Enforcement
Against Copyright Infringement
Unlike the criminal sanctions for trademark law, criminal
copyright laws have their roots in the IP Clause of the Constitution
rather than in the Commerce Clause—an important distinction in
the context of the due process question. Before engaging in an anal-
ysis of how the requirement that every element be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt should apply in a criminal copyright case, it is
worth exploring why some scholars have argued that copyright can
be regulated under only the IP Clause and not under the Commerce
Clause. One’s first instinct might be to conclude that if Congress is
unable to pass a law governing intellectual property under the IP
Clause, it should be able to revert to the Commerce Clause to do so
if the regulation could fall under the purview of the latter. Several
scholars, however, have made interesting claims as to why and how
the IP Clause is not only an enabling, but also a limiting, provision
when it comes to congressional power. This Section shows how the
due process analysis should proceed both under the traditional view
of the IP Clause and under this limiting version. It is important to
note at the outset that due process protections should apply
regardless of one’s views of the IP Clause, and the differences arise
when it comes to the specific implementation.
Basing her argument on constitutional text and history in addi-
tion to subsequent congressional actions and Supreme Court deci-
sions, Jeanne Fromer argues that Congress is allowed to promote
the progress of science and useful arts only through laws that give
authors and inventors exclusive rights for limited times.135 As a
135. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE
L.J. 1329, 1331-32 (2012). One common concern that arises is whether this theory would
make entities such as the National Science Foundation or National Institutes of Health and
their activities unconstitutional. Fromer answers in the negative, stating that “as convention-
ally structured, federal funding of artistic and scientific works seeks to promote the progress
of science and useful arts so as to secure exclusive rights to authors and inventors for limit-
ed times in their works.” Id. at 1412. She states that this takes place through “providing
funding to authors and inventors to create their works in the first place and by enabling them
generally—although not requiring them—to seek copyright and patent protection in those
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result of her analysis, she questions the constitutionality of some
laws passed pursuant to an expansive interpretation of the Com-
merce Clause or for other reasons, giving as examples laws concern-
ing trade secrets, anti-bootlegging, copyright restoration, and data-
base protection.136 Part of Fromer’s thesis rests on the fact that the
IP Clause is unique in being the only clause to specify the means
through which Congress shall carry out its power.137 She states that
the natural reading of its language leads to the conclusion that
“Congress has the power to promote the progress of science and
useful arts using solely the specified means.”138 Larry Solum has
sought to dispel the notion that the phrase “[t]o promote the Prog-
ress of Science” is simply a preamble that is followed by a power
grant; rather, he states that the history and structure of the Consti-
tution suggest that this language is part of the power grant itself.139
Dotan Oliar’s work largely agrees with the conclusion that the IP
Clause grants Congress the power to protect copyright and patents
only to the extent that this promotes the progress of science and
useful arts and only for limited times.140 As a related matter, Paul
Heald and Suzanna Sherry argue that a consistent application of
works as further incentive to create and disseminate them.” Id. For a discussion of the
complex relationship between Congress’s treaty powers and the IP Clause’s limitations, see
generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An (Inter)Nationalist Per-
spective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355 (2007); Fromer, supra, at 1385-90;
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the United
States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004). For an overview of how
other countries deal with the relationship between intellectual property and criminal law, see
generally CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMP-
ORARY RESEARCH (Christophe Geiger ed., 2012).
136. See Fromer, supra note 135, at 1391-1407.
137. Id. at 1340.
138. Id. Only one other clause in Article I, Section 8 both grants power and limits it via a
mention of both means and ends, namely the Militia Clause. Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s
Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 19 (2002).
Solum argues that the extension of copyright to life of the author plus seventy years and the
retroactive application of copyright were unconstitutional because “the actions of the first
Congress are consistent with the notion that the ‘to Authors’ limitation has real bite and
precludes Congress from acting directly to grant exclusive rights to natural or legal persons
who are not the authors of the works in which the rights are granted.” Id. at 41.
139. Solum, supra note 138, at 22-23; see also George A. Mocsary, Note, Explaining Away
the Obvious: The Infeasibility of Characterizing the Second Amendment as a Nonindividual
Right, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2161 (2008) (discussing the role of preambles in the Consti-
tution).
140. Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress
as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1790-92 (2006).
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the principles of constitutional interpretation that have guided the
Supreme Court in the context of other clauses should impose abso-
lute limits on Congress’s power to legislate under the IP Clause.141
So far, the Supreme Court has never curtailed the power of Con-
gress in the area of copyright based on any limitations within the IP
Clause. The question has prominently arisen twice in recent times.
First, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, a number of groups argued that the
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) of 1998 was unconstitutional
because it violated the provision in the IP Clause that protection
shall only extend for “limited Times.”142 The petitioners argued that
the CTEA’s extension of copyrights for an additional twenty years
for existing works was problematic because the initial copyright
term represented an outside boundary that Congress could not ex-
ceed.143 The Court rejected the argument that the CTEA sought to
evade the “limited Times” constraint and risked creating perpetual
copyrights.144 The petitioners tried a number of other arguments,
including that the CTEA failed to “promote the Progress of Sci-
ence.”145 The Court, however, emphasized that Congress can decide
how best to pursue the objectives of the IP Clause and stated that
Congress had been making unchallenged adjustments to copyright
duration for over two hundred years.146 Justice Stevens dissented,
stating that “[n]either the purpose of encouraging new inventions
nor the overriding interest in advancing progress by adding knowl-
edge to the public domain is served by retroactively increasing the
inventor’s compensation for a completed invention.”147 He explained
141. Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intel-
lectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119,
1119. But see Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331,
2358-65 (2003) (disagreeing with the limiting theories of the IP Clause as a historical and
jurisprudential matter).
142. 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
143. Id. at 199.
144. Id. at 209.
145. Id. at 210-14.
146. Id. The Court specifically mentioned that “a contemporaneous legislative exposition
of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution
were actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the
construction to be given [the Constitution’s] provisions.” Id. at 213 (quoting Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926)).
147. Id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2015] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1773
that the history of previous copyright extensions was relevant but
not conclusive for this case, and that the lack of scrutiny that
previous extensions received does not immunize the CTEA from
such an inquiry.148 Justice Breyer also dissented, writing that the
CTEA exceeds the bounds of Congress’s power because it crosses the
line between what is unwise and what is unconstitutional.149 He
concluded that “the incentive-related numbers are far too small for
Congress to have concluded rationally, even with respect to new
works, that the extension’s economic-incentive effect could justify
the serious expression-related harms.”150
The second major case to test congressional power over copyright
was Golan v. Holder, in which several groups challenged the
constitutionality of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA).151
The law granted rights to the owners of some preexisting foreign
works that were protected in their countries of origin but were in
the public domain in the United States.152 The petitioners argued
that the text of the IP Clause provides a barrier against protection
for works after they are in the public domain, but the Court saw no
such barrier in the text, history, or precedents.153 Like in Eldred, the
Court rejected an argument that the extension (or even creation) of
terms conflicted with the “limited Times” language or potentially
promoted a scheme of perpetual copyright.154 The Court pointed to
several instances of copyright term restoration and rejected the idea
that the URAA failed to promote progress just because it applied to
preexisting works; the Court stated that not only creation but also
dissemination of works constitutes progress.155 Justice Breyer again
dissented, this time joined by Justice Alito, arguing that the URAA
neither incentivized new works nor promoted dissemination.156
148. Id. at 239. 
149. Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 257. For an extensive discussion of the Eldred decision, see, for example,
Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 141, at 2359. Schwartz and Treanor detail the multiple
reasons that lead them to believe that Eldred left open numerous questions regarding the
proper constitutional treatment of the IP Clause. See id. at 2359-63.
151. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
152. Id. at 884.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 884-85.
155. Id. at 886, 888-89.
156. Id. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in
Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (2013) (analyzing the levels of
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It is useful to conduct the criminal due process inquiry as to the
IP Clause under both the traditional interpretation and that pro-
posed by Fromer, Solum, Oliar, and Heald and Sherry, among oth-
ers.157 Courts have not yet accepted the latter theory in the civil
context, but the gravity of criminal sanctions may eventually pro-
vide the additional impetus needed to seriously consider these
scholars’ arguments. The idea that every element must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution, as proposed by
Lemos and Carter and discussed above in the context of criminal
enforcement against trademark offenses,158 applies with equal force
in the context of the IP Clause as of the Commerce Clause. There
are differences, however, in how the two clauses are phrased that
modify the precise inquiry. For trademarks, federal courts have le-
gitimate power only if the defendant engaged in interstate com-
merce beyond a reasonable doubt.159 The IP Clause, however, does
not discuss the behavior of defendants but rather focuses solely on
the relationship between the government and an author.160 The IP
Clause speaks to Congress’s constitutional ability to “secur[e] for
limited Times ... the exclusive Right.”161 Federal courts therefore
have power over a defendant only if he has violated an exclusive
right. The inquiry would simply consist of establishing beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant violated an owner’s copyright. The
act of “securing” would naturally include writing and enforcing laws
so as to protect exclusive rights.162 Under the traditional view of the
IP Clause, the due process scrutiny ends here.163 There is, however,
constitutional scrutiny that the Court used in Eldred and Golan and contrasting them with
those in other cases).
157. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text.
159. See supra Part II.B.
160. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
162. For a discussion of whether Congress should enforce moral rights in addition to the
exclusive rights enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012), see Kenneth Einar Himma, Towards
a Lockean Moral Justification of Legal Protection of Intellectual Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1105, 1125-27 (2012).
163. The traditional inquiry may not even require that step if the law and individual
prosecution at bar are alternatively found to be a constitutional application of the Commerce
Clause. See generally Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004) (arguing that under an evolving understanding of the Com-
merce Clause and the IP Clause, laws invalid under the latter could be passed under the
former).
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a second and more complex step if one accepts that the first part of
the IP Clause has a limiting purpose.164 Combining this theory with
the due process requirement suggests that a defendant can be con-
victed only if a prosecutor can show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the way the “securing” of exclusive rights took place against the
defendant served “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”165 If the prosecutor cannot prove that, then the federal court
has no jurisdiction over the defendant, just as it lacks jurisdiction
over trademark defendants who have not engaged in interstate
commerce.
So far, criminal copyright statutes have largely remained unchal-
lenged. One statute that has seen more action in the courts than
others is § 2319A, which criminalizes the “unauthorized fixation of
and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos of live musical
performances.”166 Significantly, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held in United States v. Martignon that even if the statute
was an impermissible exercise of congressional authority under the
IP Clause, Congress had the power to enact the law under the
Commerce Clause.167 The district court had found the statute un-
constitutional.168 The Second Circuit, however, declined to decide
whether the term “Writings” placed live performances outside the
purview of the IP Clause, instead concluding that such works could
constitutionally be protected under the Commerce Clause.169 The
Second Circuit expressed the view “that the Supreme Court’s cases
allow the regulation of matters that could not be regulated under
the Copyright Clause in a manner arguably inconsistent with that
164. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
165. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2012).
167. 492 F.3d 140, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2007). A California district court case dealing with a
similar issue explained that “the question is not whether legislation empowered by the
Copyright Clause—but invalid under it—can otherwise be empowered by the Commerce
Clause. The question is whether matters not encompassed within the Copyright Clause can
be addressed by the Commerce Clause free of the restrictions of the Copyright Clause.” Kiss
Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2005). This
perspective ignores the possibility that the promotion of science and the useful arts may be
under the exclusive province of the IP Clause and not the Commerce Clause. See generally
Fromer, supra note 135.
168. See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
169. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 145-46.
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clause unless the statute at issue is a copyright law.”170 The court
explained that § 2319A does not fall under the purview of the IP
Clause because:
[It] does not create and bestow property rights upon authors
or inventors, or allocate those rights among claimants to them....
It is, perhaps, analogous to the law of criminal trespass. Rather
than creating a right in the performer him- or herself, it creates
a power in the government to protect the interest of performers
from commercial predations. Section 2319A does not grant the
performer the right to exclude others from the performance—
only the government can do that.171
The Second Circuit’s reasoning is rather problematic. When a law
prohibits person A from taking an action against person B, it is gen-
erally fair to say that this law creates a form of right for B. It is not
clear why it is relevant who enforces that right—whether B does so
in a civil action or the government in a criminal action. Further, as
Jeanne Fromer explains, Congress clearly enacted § 2319A to fur-
ther the goals of intellectual property, and among other things, even
labeled both the civil and criminal portions as “[c]opyright [p]rovi-
sions.”172
Fromer also criticizes the idea that just because unfixed perfor-
mances are not “Writings,” they escape the limitations of the IP
Clause. To the contrary, she argues, their lack of status as “Writ-
ings” constitutes an attempt by Congress “to promote the progress
of science and useful arts without confining itself to the IP Clause’s
prescribed means.”173
A different case, United States v. Moghadam, dismissed the im-
portance of determining which constitutional provision Congress
believed provided the relevant power to enact an anti-bootlegging
law.174 The court in Moghadam “decline[d] to decide ... whether the
170. Id. at 149.
171. Id. at 151.
172. Fromer, supra note 135, at 1398 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). 
173. Id. at 1401.
174. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). The law prohibits the unauthorized fixation of live
musical performances and is unrelated to alcohol-related bootlegging. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A
(2012). 
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fixation concept of the Copyright Clause [could] be expanded so as
to encompass live performances.”175 The court held that the statute
was a proper exercise of authority under the Commerce Clause des-
pite the lack of legislative findings tying the conduct to interstate or
foreign commerce and the absence of a jurisdictional element in the
statute.176 The court went on to say that “[t]he absence of such a
jurisdictional element simply means that courts must determine
independently whether the statute regulates activities that arise
out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which view-
ed in the aggregate, substantially affect commerce.”177 As explained
above, in the case of a criminal statute, the aggregate effect on
commerce is insufficient; at a minimum, assuming that regulation
under the Commerce Clause is otherwise proper, the prosecutor
should have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s link
to commerce.178
The court in Moghadam also addressed whether Congress’s use
of the Commerce Clause power via an anti-bootlegging provision
conflicted with the limitations of the IP Clause. It acknowledged
some tension in the previous case law regarding whether a statute
that runs afoul of the limitations inherent in one constitutional pro-
vision can be upheld under another provision.179 The court concluded
that “although a live musical performance may not have been fixed,
or reduced to tangible form, as of the time the bootleg copy was
made, it certainly was subject to having been thus fixed.”180 The
court explained that because a previous legislative change allowed
performers to protect live performances simply by simultaneously
transmitting them, “the anti-bootlegging law seems to us like more
of an incremental change than a constitutional breakthrough.”181
Even if that were true, it may be the increment that breaks the
camel’s back. In the case of transmission, the transmitted work is
175. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1273-74. The court also noted that the law would potentially
run afoul of the “limited Times” provision, though the defendant at bar failed to raise this
latter issue. Id. As with the fixation issue, the court “decline[d] to address the argument in
light of its disposition.” Id. at 1274 n.9.
176. Id. at 1275-76, 1282.
177. Id. at 1276.
178. See supra Part II.B.
179. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279-80.
180. Id. at 1280.
181. Id. at 1280-81.
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considered fixed, and therefore an individual who records the live
performance is creating a work identical to the fixed one, even if she
is not drawing the data from the transmission.182 Although the
fixation and copying occur simultaneously and draw data from the
same source, it is fair to say that at any given time, the illegal
recording is of a thing that is also in that same moment fixed.
Bootlegs, however, refer to works that the performer, by definition,
never fixed.183 This is a crucial distinction. To imply, as the
Moghadam court did, that the step between previous fixation to
simultaneous fixation is of the same quantum or type as the step
between simultaneous fixation and no fixation, is untenable. If no
fixation occurs, as Fromer states, Congress goes from promoting
progress in a manner the Constitution authorizes to one it does
not.184 There is logic to accepting simultaneous transmission as
fixation, but there is no ambiguity about the fact that a performance
that was never recorded or transmitted simply cannot be designated
as fixed.185 Congress’s goal, however, was to promote progress via
the anti-bootlegging provisions, so Fromer has a valid claim that the
provisions are unconstitutional altogether if one accepts the limiting
view of the IP Clause.186
In every case, it is essential to understand into which rubric a
specific IP-related criminal statute falls by determining whether it
is an exercise of the IP power or the Commerce power. First, if the
182. See id. at 1280 (basing a similar conclusion on “the definition of ‘fixed’ in 17 U.S.C.
§ 101”).
183. Part of this may depend on one’s understanding of the meaning of a “work.” The com-
position was often written down even if the performance was not. This Article argues that the
composition is not the relevant “work” for purposes of Moghadam because copyright law
specifically distinguishes between compositions and performances in a number of contexts.
See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that a copyright
holder who licenses a sound recording retains an independent copyright in the underlying
composition); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 107 (1976) (wording the legislation to “avoid the dan-
ger of confusion between rights in a sound recording and rights in the musical composition”).
I would like to thank Jake Linford for our conversation on this topic.
184. See generally Fromer, supra note 135.
185. See, e.g., David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1409 (1995)
(noting that no reasonable interpretation of the term “writings” could encompass an untaped
opera performance).
186. See Fromer, supra note 135, at 1401. Even if Congress had not made this intent
explicit, it could have been surmised from other pieces of evidence such as statutory structure
and context. See id. at 1398. Thus, Congress would not be able to escape the limitations of the
IP Clause simply by omitting any mention of legislative intent.
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criminal statute does not fit with the former but only with the lat-
ter, one has to ascertain that it does not conflict with the language
of the IP Clause, or else the statute is unconstitutional altogether
under the limiting version of the IP Clause.187 Second, if a statute is
constitutional, the constitutional provision that otherwise autho-
rizes the statute dictates the contours of the due process inquiry in
every individual case. As discussed, for the Commerce Clause, the
prosecution must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt the link
between the defendant’s conduct and interstate commerce.188 For the
IP Clause, the prosecution would have to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that a conviction helps to secure the exclusive rights of an
author and, if one adopts the limiting understanding of the IP
Clause, that this act of securing rights against the defendant serves
to promote progress.189 The next Section illustrates how these types
of analyses would proceed.
D. The Due Process Inquiry Applied
The first matter of interest is exploring what kinds of cases would
encounter problems under the Commerce Clause. As discussed, the
government would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
trademark counterfeits were sold or transported through the chan-
nels of interstate commerce or at least affected commerce for a
criminal prosecution to be constitutional.190 In many past cases, this
explicit requirement would likely not have affected the outcome of
the legal proceedings because numerous defendants were caught
red-handed in the process of sale or transportation.191 So far, alleged
counterfeiters have not tried to make the constitutional argument
proposed in this Article. There could be multiple reasons for this.
187. See id. at 1401.
188. See supra Part II.B.
189. See infra Part II.E. A number of interesting issues may arise in this context, such as
whether the particulars of the work and of the author are relevant to that determination. This
Article cabins these questions, but the issues merit further exploration before the due process
requirements discussed here are fully implemented. I would like to thank Jake Linford for his
comments on this matter.
190. See supra Part II.B.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Diallo, 476 F. Supp. 2d 497 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (involving a
defendant who had purchased counterfeit Louis Vuitton goods in New York and was transpor-
ting them to Indiana when he was pulled over in Pennsylvania). 
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First, their attorneys may not have considered the constitutional
argument. Second, their attorneys may have considered it, but be-
lieved it would fail given the courts’ stare decisis on the Commerce
Clause, or for other reasons. Finally, the counterfeiters—like past
defendants—may have been unable to deny that the illicit goods
were linked to interstate commerce. Whatever the reasons that have
led to the decisions we have seen, this Article provides examples of
situations that could cause problems for prosecutors.
One scenario would involve an individual creating a counterfeit
for personal intrastate use. This scenario has some parallels to
growing medical marijuana for oneself in that there is no guarantee
that a thing created for such personal use will never enter interstate
commerce.192 This may have been implausible in the past due to the
technical difficulties in creating counterfeits, but 3D printing tech-
nologies and their potential to create counterfeit fashion items are
likely to vastly increase the number of such cases in coming years.193
The question of how large trademark owners will react both in the
civil realm and in relation to pressuring the government to prose-
cute is a subject ripe for speculation.194 The fluid nature of the
modern marketplace magnifies the importance of the matter. Some-
thing made in one’s home is just a few mouse clicks away from
being sold on Etsy195 or eBay.196 The shift between selling counter-
feits in one’s own state and selling them across state lines may also
potentially be a rapid one, and increasing numbers of defendants
whose behavior is on the cusp of being subject to federal power may
get caught up in legal action.
192. For a discussion of Gonzales v. Raich, see supra Part I.D.
193. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing
and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691 (2014) (discussing the new legal issues
arising in patents, trademarks, and copyright as a result of this technology); Lucas Osborn,
Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 553 (2014).
194. Large trademark owners have a long history of encouraging increased sanctions and
more expansive legislation to protect their goods. See, e.g., Manta, Puzzle of Criminal
Sanctions, supra note 3, at 510-11.
195. The Etsy website allows individuals to sell crafted goods to customers worldwide. Etsy
About, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/about/?ref=ftr (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) [http://perma.cc/
B9J2-V2JV].
196. The eBay website allows individuals and businesses to sell goods to others, including
via an auction mechanism. See How to Sell Online with EBay, EBAY, https://www.ebay.com
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015) [http://perma.cc/HUD5-QWE5].
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Another interesting issue is how to handle defendants who
attempt to sell or transport counterfeits in interstate commerce and
for some reason do not complete their attempts. Although the law
generally does not recognize causes of action for attempted criminal
copyright infringement or the like,197 attempting to traffic in coun-
terfeit goods is explicitly prohibited by § 2320.198 For example, in the
unreported case United States v. Ohri, the government seized in-
fringing goods that a delivery truck was about to bring to the
defendants’ business premises.199 Section 2320 explains that “the
term ‘traffic’ means to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of,
to another, for purposes of commercial advantage or private finan-
cial gain, or to make, import, export, obtain control of, or possess,
with intent to so transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of.”200 To
maintain constitutionality in cases of counterfeiting prosecution,
attempts to traffic would, at a minimum, need to be attempts to
traffic in interstate commerce. In scenarios similar to Ohri, the pros-
ecution would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendants were not only trying to make a profit by disposing of
counterfeits, but that these future activities would specifically take
place in interstate commerce.201 Depending on the circumstances,
this element may be difficult to demonstrate. In some cases, the de-
fendants may not deny it or may have set up a website that already
sells other infringing goods across the nation, which could poten-
tially provide sufficient circumstantial evidence for a guilty ver-
dict.202 In other cases, however, law enforcement may have stepped
in before any such steps were taken, making the prosecutors’ task
of meeting their burden of proof more difficult.203
197. “[T]here is no liability for an attempt to infringe under the Copyright Act.” Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1218 (D. Minn. 2008). The closest that Con-
gress has come to inchoate liability for copyright offenses is its criminalization of attempted
circumvention of digital rights management (DRM) technologies that copyright owners place
in music, a criminalization that Congress accomplished via the 1998 Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
198. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (2012). 
199. No. 1:06cr245, 2007 WL 150799, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 16, 2007). 
200. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(5).
201. See supra Part II.B.
202. In other contexts, courts have held that the Internet is either a channel or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir.
2006).
203. For a broader discussion of questions of attempt in federal criminal law, see generally
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The standards I delineate for how the presumption of innocence
should apply in the case of copyright engender their own complica-
tions. As mentioned, if one adopts a limiting view of the IP Clause,
situations involving copyrightable subject matter should be ana-
lyzed under only the IP Clause and should not be allowed to fall
under the purview of the Commerce Clause.204 In many criminal
copyright cases so far, courts have lumped the Commerce Clause
into the discussion,205 which would need to cease if criminal copy-
right violations could be analyzed under only the IP clause. From
here on, the analysis will focus mainly on the way to ensure consti-
tutionality under the IP Clause alone given that this provides, if
anything, the more difficult hurdle. In a few instances, courts have
explicitly stated that a criminal statute generally furthers progress,
although in the cases at bar they did not specify whether the law
was doing so beyond a reasonable doubt.206 Admittedly, my proposed
change could greatly increase the burden on courts and give juries
a lot of power in constitutional matters.207 That being said, juries
always have significant power in such matters because they decide
whether the prosecutor proved each element of the offense.208 One
of the reasons that we have juries is to provide a check on govern-
mental power, as exemplified by the doctrine of jury nullification.209
Although criminal copyright law does not deal with attempt,
courts have convicted defendants of conspiracy to commit criminal
copyright infringement. A recent case involved a plan by the In-
ternet piracy group IMAGiNE to reproduce and distribute tens of
Robert E. Wagner, A Few Good Laws: Why Federal Criminal Law Needs a General Attempt
Provision and How Military Law Can Provide One, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1043 (2010). 
204. See supra Part II.C.
205. See supra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(“Protecting the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners against unlawful piracy by
preventing trafficking in tools that would enable widespread piracy and unlawful infringe-
ment is consistent with the purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause’s grant to Congress
of the power to promote the useful arts and sciences.”).
207. See generally Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L. REV.
849 (2014) (examining the relationship between juries and constitutional questions).
208. Cf. id. at 897 (detailing how juries determine liability on the elements in a § 1983
action).
209. But see Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury
Nullification, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1176-77 (2011) (suggesting that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Framers did not find jury nullification consistent with the sort of civil rights
that courts were meant to enforce in former slave states). 
2015] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1783
thousands of works—such as infringing copies of movies—before the
works could be released on legitimate DVDs.210 Cases involving
conspiracies to infringe on copyrighted works would have to fall
under the same type of analysis as do completed actions; prosecu-
tors would have to show that securing a copyright by punishing a
conspiracy serves the progress of science and the useful arts,
whereas for trademark-related conspiracies, they would need to
establish a link to the Commerce Clause.211
In some cases, the breadth of the progress analysis for criminal
copyright infringement prosecutions, whether for conspiracies or
completed actions, could become difficult to define.212 What is the
proper time span to measure said progress? What if allowing the
infringement in a given case is likely to promote progress, even
though disallowing it would serve as a tool of progress in a narrower
sense—that is, is the measure of promotion of progress absolute or
relative? To what extent does the analysis have to account for effects
of the case outcome on the behavior of third parties and their
increased or decreased contributions to progress? Some of these
inquiries will require juries or judges to make uncomfortable and
even quasi-legislative determinations. Yet, if one agrees with the
limiting nature of the IP Clause and with the principle that the
presumption of innocence applies to jurisdictional hooks, the
alternative legitimate solution may be nothing short of a constitu-
tional amendment.
The effects of these increased burdens on the number and types
of prosecutions in trademark and copyright cases are a matter of
interest and some speculation. As mentioned previously, the overall
number of cases could either remain similar or diminish depending
on various factors.213 It appears plausible from the analysis in this
210. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Leader of Internet Piracy Group “IMAGiNE”
Pleads Guilty to Copyright Infringement Conspiracy (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/leader-internet-piracy-group-imagine-pleads-guilty-copyright-infringement-conspiracy
[http://perma.cc/86VC-5NVQ].
211. Cf. United States v. Pickney, 85 F.3d 4, 8 (2d Cir. 1996) (requiring the government to
prove either that stolen auto parts had moved in interstate commerce or that the conspirators
believed the parts had moved in interstate commerce).
212. As mentioned, the Supreme Court seems to have set a fairly low bar in Eldred and
Golan for what constitutes progress. See supra Part II.C. 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33. Alternatively, prosecutors may push
harder for plea bargains through techniques like charge stacking if they view the actual court
costs as problematically high under my proposed rules. For a discussion of charge stacking,
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Part that the prosecutorial burden will effectively rise less for
trademark counterfeiting cases than for copyright infringement ones
because many of the former are likely to meet the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” requirement for the jurisdictional hook, whereas
the latter may run into difficulties more frequently if courts also
adopt the limiting view of the IP Clause. In 2012, the latest year on
record, federal prosecutors filed 110 cases for trafficking in counter-
feit goods or services under § 2320.214 They filed only forty cases for
criminal copyright infringement under § 2319 and its complement
§ 506.215 The number of criminal copyright infringement cases is
small even though private organizations like the RIAA, MPAA, and
others lobby to have the government pursue such actions and
contribute their own resources to maximize enforcement.216 Private
organizations have even pushed state prosecutors to pursue copy-
right infringers, a practice of questionable constitutionality given
preemption concerns, but one that could increase as more federal
prosecutors run into constitutional obstacles under the proposals in
this Article.217 Copyright owners may also turn to more aggressive
tactics in civil enforcement, although these often represent a second-
best option due to their costliness and their more limited ability to
achieve general deterrence.218
E. Questions About the Due Process Inquiry
The due process inquiry proposed here raises a number of ques-
tions, and this Section seeks to address the most pertinent ones. The
see Manta, High Cost, supra note 3, at 195-99. I would like to thank Joseph Fishman for our
discussion on this point. 
214. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT app. D,
at D-5 (2012), available at http://perma.cc/39RS-83DT.
215. Id. at D-3.
216. See, e.g., Kim F. Natividad, Note, Stepping It Up and Taking It to the Streets:
Changing Civil & Criminal Copyright Enforcement Tactics, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 485
(2008).
217. See, e.g., Andrew Scurria, Calif. AG Tees Up Preemption Fight on Film Piracy, LAW360
(June 25, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/452211/calif-ag-tees-up-preemption-
fight-on-film-piracy [http://perma.cc/LFN6-9EE5].
218. See Manta, Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 3, at 494, 502-03 (discussing how
criminal prosecutions can shift litigation costs away from intellectual property owners to the
government and how criminal sanctions can especially serve to deter defendants that would
be judgment-proof in civil actions). 
2015] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1785
first issue, which is mentioned above, is why it is insufficient to
show that counterfeiting took place against a federally registered
mark even though that original mark must have been in interstate
commerce.219 The second question discussed here is why the
individualized analysis of constitutionality should be limited to
criminal intellectual property cases rather than also encompass civil
ones. Although the optimal type and level of scrutiny for civil cases
remains subject to future exploration, I give a brief account of the
elements that divide the criminal and civil inquiry, showing that it
does not inexorably follow from my analysis that the civil law should
go the way of the criminal one. In short, I demonstrate that there is
no constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence for civil
cases, and that Congress’s ability to reverse presumptions that favor
defendants is significantly greater in the civil than in the criminal
context. Third, I briefly delineate the applicability of my analysis to
trade secrets. Last, I discuss some of the practical issues related to
the implementation of my proposal.
The first topic of interest is why we cannot constitutionally
punish a defendant simply for creating a counterfeit of a federally
registered mark.220 The reason for potentially taking the opposite
tack is that the original mark must have been in interstate com-
merce, and so any counterfeit is necessarily an infringement
indirectly tied to interstate commerce. As a statutory matter, the
trademark counterfeiting statute currently emphasizes only the for-
profit nature of the illicit conduct.221 If counterfeiting any federally
registered mark were enough, then it could potentially suffice to
show infringement as long as the mark was properly registered
beyond a reasonable doubt (which would include that the original
mark must have been used in interstate commerce). This approach
is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it would allow the
criminal counterfeiting statute to potentially reach more behaviors
than the civil infringement provisions in the Lanham Act. Even for
registered marks, the Lanham Act imposes liability only on
behavior that occurred in connection with commerce.222 The term
“commerce” is defined as “all commerce which may lawfully be
219. See supra Part II.B.
220. I would like to thank Felix Wu for our conversation on this point.
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012).
222. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012).
1786 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1745
regulated by Congress.”223 The courts have held that this includes
intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,
including a negative impact on a trademark owner’s reputation and
goodwill.224 At no point have courts suggested that, as a constitu-
tional matter, this definition of “commerce” could encompass intra-
state behavior that does not have an impact on interstate behavior
just because interstate commerce is a prerequisite to the federal
trademark registration of the original trademark.225 It appears
inconsistent for Congress’s power to reach only certain kinds of
interstate commerce-related activities in the civil context and yet all
for-profit activities regardless of their relationship with interstate
commerce in the criminal context.
Another point to consider is that a trademark registration cannot
be treated the same way as a gun. The post-Lopez statute requires
that a firearm “has moved in or ... otherwise affects interstate ...
commerce” before its use in a school zone can be criminalized.226
Some would argue that the original trademark’s travels in inter-
state commerce before it received federal registration suffice in that
the counterfeit mark is “the same” as the original, an idea briefly
mentioned in Part II.B. The statutory definition of a counterfeit
mark does not seem to allow for that interpretation. For example,
one of the definitions for a counterfeit mark is “a spurious mark ...
that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a
mark registered on the principal register in the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO).”227 All definitions of a counterfeit mark call
it a “spurious mark” or a “spurious designation” of various sorts.228
The original federally registered mark is not and cannot be literally
223. Id. § 1127. 
224. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Stewart, 621 F.2d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 1980) (citing Franchised
Stores of N.Y., Inc. v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664, 669 (2d Cir. 1968)).
225. This issue is not to be confused with the one of whether “use in commerce”—which is
a separately defined term in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 and whose legislative history received much
discussion in Rescuecom v. Google, 562 F.3d 123, 132-36 (2d Cir. 2009)—should apply to
infringing behavior. “The Act frequently employs the term ‘in commerce’ for the distinct pur-
pose of invoking Congress’s Commerce Clause jurisdiction and staying within its limits.” Id.
at 134 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127). The Rescuecom court explicitly distinguished the phrase “use
in commerce” from the requirement that infringing activity take place in commerce, “a
jurisdictional predicate for Congress’s power to legislate in this area.” Id. at 136.
226. Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2012). 
227. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(1).
228. See id.
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the same thing as the spurious mark. In the post-Lopez statute, the
gun itself must have traveled in interstate commerce at some point.
Just because the PTO provides protection for an intangible good
when it awards federal trademark registration does not mean that
said intangible good can be said to be the same one that showed up
in the form of a counterfeit several states away. Hence, for the
criminal counterfeiting statute to have a constitutionally sufficient
jurisdiction hook, the counterfeit itself must have been sold in, have
traveled in, or at least have affected interstate commerce.
The second question to address is why the conclusions I draw in
the criminal context need not necessarily apply in the civil one. The
answer to this question relates to the additional protections present
in criminal matters. In a case involving a juvenile charged with an
act that would constitute a crime if an adult had committed it, the
Supreme Court held in In re Winship that every element of a crime
has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.229 This holding was later extended
outside the juvenile context to mean that the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every relevant element of a
crime.230 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held under a principle
known as the “rule of lenity” that courts should resolve statutory
ambiguities in criminal prosecutions in favor of defendants.231 This
combination of constitutional and statutory doctrines exists because
of the special harshness of criminal sanctions, which can include
deprivations of liberty or even—outside the intellectual property
context—of life.
As courts have held and scholars have explained, there is no true
equivalent to these doctrines in the civil context.232 The theories
229. 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970). Meanwhile, the basic requirement of the presumption of
innocence has been recognized in American jurisprudence for a long time. See Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies
at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”). 
230. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000).
231. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987). For a broader discussion
of the rule of lenity and its applications, see generally Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a
Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (2004).
232. See, e.g., Rabon v. Great Sw. Fire Ins., 818 F.2d 306, 310-11 (4th Cir. 1987) (over-
turning a finding of liability on the basis that the trial court instructed jurors that the
presumption of innocence applies in both the criminal and civil settings); Reed v. State, 574
N.E.2d 433, 436 (N.Y. 1991) (“We long ago held that the presumption of innocence is not
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delineated in this Article about the courts’ obligations when crimin-
ally convicting defendants in copyright or trademark cases cannot
be applied to civil cases without further ado. Margaret Lemos’s
critique of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
precisely that importing conclusions from the civil setting into the
criminal one would be a mistake.233 This Article has shown how
those types of conclusions run afoul of the presumption of innocence
in the context of criminal sanctions for intellectual property in-
fringement. It would similarly be a mistake at this juncture to turn
around and assume that the analysis here, which is based on
principles specific to criminal law, should necessarily change consti-
tutional doctrine in civil cases. For example, my critique of Perez—
itself a criminal case—is based on principles unique to criminal due
process.234 If courts turn away from Perez, they should follow suit
and abdicate the principles established in Raich pursuant to Perez.
That does not necessarily mean, however, that striking down Perez
would automatically entail deeming federal civil sanctions for
marijuana-related offenses unconstitutional. Perhaps such civil
sanctions are indeed unconstitutional for other reasons, but if that
is the case, it does not result from notions tied to the presumption
of innocence because the Supreme Court has never extended this
presumption to the civil context. It is not simply a matter of there
being an equivalent but lower bar on the civil side. Rather, there is
currently no principle in civil jurisprudence imposing a burden of
this kind at all. Should future scholars wish to argue that the
analysis in this Article ought to apply in the civil context as well,
they will at a minimum first have to show why such a burden needs
to exist as a constitutional matter.
The third issue worth examining is how trade secrets fit into the
framework developed in this Article. The term trade secret refers to
a variety of information that is protected at the state and/or federal
indulged in a civil action because of the lesser burden of proof.”); Ellen S. Podgor, Interna-
tional Computer Fraud: A Paradigm for Limiting National Jurisdiction, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
267, 307 (2002) (“[T]he presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt burden accorded
the criminally accused does not match that used in civil cases. Civil wrongs do not entail jail
time, are not premised on the same punishment theories, and do not carry the stigma that is
associated with criminal penalties.”).
233. See generally Lemos, supra note 108.
234. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); see supra notes 53-55, 117-19 and accom-
panying text.
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level, and this Section limits its analysis to trade secrets as protec-
ted by the Economic Espionage Act to provide illustration while
streamlining the discussion.235 Congress passed the Economic Espio-
nage Act in 1996 to protect against the theft of trade secrets and the
improper disclosure of trade secrets intended to benefit foreign
governments, instrumentalities, or agents.236 Some scholars argue
that this law was a legitimate congressional exercise of Commerce
Clause powers.237 If that is correct, then courts must treat trade
secrets like trademarks as analyzed in this Article, and prosecutors
must prove a link to commerce in the same individualized manner.
Some of the offenses covered under the Economic Espionage Act
already require this type of link. For example, § 1832 covers theft of
a trade secret “that is related to a product or service used in or
intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce.”238 Section 1831,
however, deals with economic espionage and only mandates intent
or knowledge “that the offense will benefit any foreign government,
foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.”239 To square this particu-
lar section with the analysis in this Article, prosecutors would
additionally need to show that the espionage in a given case took
place in or affected interstate commerce. Alternatively, if one adopts
the limiting interpretation of the IP Clause, then the Economic
Espionage Act is likely unconstitutional altogether because the “law
has a strong structural purpose of promoting the progress of science
and useful arts, but ... does not comply with the IP Clause’s limited
means.”240
Other federal provisions, including those prohibiting bootlegging
and the like, must be analyzed similarly to trade secret laws.241
The first question is whether one adopts the traditional or limiting
view of the IP Clause. If the former, one must examine whether a
law fits into either the Commerce Clause or the IP Clause in an
individualized manner. If the answer is no to both, that law is
235. 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2012).
236. Id. §§ 1831-1836.
237. See, e.g., William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property:
An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 394 (1999). 
238. 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
239. Id. § 1831.
240. Fromer, supra note 135, at 1391-92. 
241. See id. at 1396-1402 (arguing that federal antibootlegging laws are unconstitutional
under the limiting view of the IP Clause).
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unconstitutional. If it is yes to either, it is constitutional. To deter-
mine if one should instead adopt the limiting view of the IP Clause,
one must ask whether the law at bar is one that falls into the
category of seeking to promote progress. If no, one would analyze its
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause in an individualized
manner and draw conclusions accordingly. If yes, one would an-
alyze its constitutionality under the IP Clause in an individual-
ized manner and ensure that it meets the other elements of the IP
Clause, such as that it covers actual “Writings,” after which one
would make a final determination depending on whether it meets
all these requirements.242
The final question as to the due process inquiry proposed in this
Article, is how courts will be able to practically conduct the inquiry
if it is coupled with the limiting understanding of the IP Clause. As
mentioned previously, under the traditional theory of the IP Clause,
prosecutors would, at most, bear the additional obligation of show-
ing in each case that the securing of an author’s right is occurring
beyond a reasonable doubt.243 If courts adopt the limiting under-
standing, however, prosecutors will further have to show that the
protection of rights via convictions promotes progress. The first step
to doing so may entail bringing in experts who can discuss the
economic effects of a defendant’s infringement and the way that
stopping him would promote progress. Although making economic
predictions can be complex, it is a task that experts already perform
in the courtroom in matters such as copyright fair use cases, in
which experts have to forecast the effect of the defendant’s work on
the market for the plaintiff ’s work,244 or antitrust cases, in which ex-
perts must gauge the impact on the market of potentially anticom-
petitive behavior.245 The government also sometimes uses experts
242. For a discussion of United States v. Moghadam, see supra Part II.C.
243. See supra Part II.B-C.
244. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U.
L. REV. 975, 1026-27 (2002) (discussing the role that expert testimony played in the judicial
fair use analysis in regard to the Napster file-sharing technology). 
245. Experts testify to such matters both in civil and criminal antitrust cases. For a general
discussion of the role of experts in that context, see generally Rebecca Haw, Adversarial
Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic Consensus in the Battle of Experts, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 1261 (2012). For a more detailed explanation of the merits of different statis-
tical methods to predict the impact of allegedly improper practices in the antitrust context,
see generally Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048
(1985). These methods would certainly necessitate further study before being adapted to the
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who testify about more general market effects in criminal copyright
prosecutions.246
If one adopts both my proposal and the limiting understanding of
the IP Clause, the same kinds of experts would have to provide more
refined testimony, addressing matters relevant to the jurisdictional
hook in individual cases. The defense would have the opportunity to
cross-examine such experts in criminal copyright cases and bring in
its own experts, and the jury would ultimately decide whether to
believe the prosecution’s experts beyond a reasonable doubt. The
conclusions of the jury could vary depending on a number of factors,
including the amount of infringement that a defendant committed.
The Department of Justice already pursues primarily large-scale
infringers, which is not necessarily a downside from a policy per-
spective, and such infringers are more likely to be found to impede
progress than small-scale infringers would. Although the due pro-
cess inquiry places higher burdens on the prosecution and possibly
increases costs for defendants if they choose to hire their own
experts, even if courts adopt the stricter limiting interpretation of
the IP Clause, the due process inquiry will not impose any truly new
or unusual requirements on the parties and courts, but rather will
build on existing mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
Until now, the Constitution has played a fairly modest role in
constraining the enforcement of criminal sanctions for intellectual
property infringement outside of the mandates that are also placed
on other types of criminal prosecution. As this Article has shown,
however, there are constitutional issues unique to the IP context to
which courts need to pay attention before convicting defendants.
Prosecutors must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that trademark
counterfeits traveled or were sold in interstate commerce, or at least
affected that commerce, before a jury can convict a defendant for a
trademark violation. Less intuitively, prosecutors should have to
particular context that this Article proposes, but nothing inherently stands in the way of
doing so. 
246. See, e.g., United States v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The government
also presented expert testimony on the harmful effect of Internet piracy on the potential
market for the copyrighted work, though we think this point is fairly obvious.”). 
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demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that convicting a defendant
for criminal copyright infringement will serve to secure the owner’s
rights, and if one adopts a limiting view of the IP Clause, that this
occurs in such a manner as to promote the progress of science and
the useful arts. Neither of these readings fits smoothly with the
Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on related matters, but both
are derived from what I consider the proper understanding of the
text and logic of the Constitution. Implementing these changes may
also help to better align criminal prosecution practice with the key
policy goals of intellectual property law by, for example, preventing
counterfeiters from disrupting national commerce on the trademark
side and hampering infringers who seek to interfere with the pro-
cess of creation on the copyright side.
Adopting my proposal is likely to change prosecutorial behavior
more in the copyright than in the trademark context if it occurs in
conjunction with a move toward a limiting view of the IP Clause,
and doing so could lead to a shift away from some types of copyright-
related prosecutions. For both trademarks and copyright, the model
I delineate could increase the cost of prosecutions or decrease the
likelihood of conviction. It is certainly true that IP owners have a lot
of power and lobbying resources and that they would likely deploy
these resources in favor of rules that permit expanded prosecution.
Nonetheless, history has shown that constitutional protections tend
to remain robust over time, even in the face of challenges from pow-
erful interests. Mere power alone, without a broad consensus of
justice, is unlikely to bring about the constitutional amendment that
would change this predicament.
